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Leaders with science training have not outperformed other leaders in terms of their
countries’ coronavirus responses, write Joachim Wehner (LSE) and Mark Hallerberg (Hertie
School).
When the coronavirus struck in 2020, some countries with seemingly world-leading levels
of pandemic preparedness turned into COVID-19 disaster zones. During March 2020, British
prime minister Boris Johnson boasted about shaking hands with everybody, attended a
rugby match and hosted a “baby shower” just two days before advising the public to stop
non-essential contact. In the United States and Brazil, national leaders railed against
lockdowns while COVID infections and deaths accelerated. Aghast at these failures of
leadership, some argued that female leaders, non-populists and those trained as scientists
do better than males, populists, and non-scientists. For many, German chancellor Angela
Merkel personi ed these hypotheses. As a female non-populist scientist, she was said to
exude “the calm con dence expected of a former research scientist with a doctorate in
quantum chemistry”.
Understanding why and how countries responded to the pandemic is crucial if we are to
learn the lessons and save more lives next time. Multiple factors likely played a role. Yet
crucial decisions by national leaders at the outbreak of the crisis have shaped the trajectory
of the disease. Some leaders responded quickly while others dithered or denied,
contributing to avoidable deaths. It is natural that this raises questions about systematic
patterns in leadership characteristics that can help to account for such differences. Striking
anecdotes can give clues and inspire hypotheses – but we should be careful not to
generalise from a handful of high-pro le examples. Sample selection bias can lead to the
wrong conclusions.
Angela Merkel in August 2020. Photo: © Bundesregierung/Bergmann and German
Presidency of the EU via a CC-BY-NC 2.0 licence
Concerning gender, Garikipati and Kambhampati (2021) pointed to gender differences in
attitudes to risk and leadership style to argue that compared with men, women leaders lock
down earlier because they are more “risk-averse with respect to lives” and have “a clear,
empathetic, interpersonal, and decisive communication style.” On populism, the argument
is that non-populists are more likely to listen to expert advice and acknowledge scienti c
facts, and hence act earlier than populists with their “fatal inability to face reality”.
Our results are a cautionary tale about generalisations
about how certain leadership traits translated into
di erent policy responses
The  nal cited attribute is a leader’s academic training. Why such background might matter
requires more explanation. In a crisis requiring speedy decisions, relevant expertise may
enable a leader immediately to grasp the problem. More broadly, a leader’s educational
background may be linked to personality types. Leaders who studied a natural science or
medicine are more likely to understand the pandemic, and to respond more quickly. On the
other hand, leaders may not require speci c expertise if they have highly trained advisors.
However, leaders choose their advisors, and they can  re or ignore experts with whom they
disagree.
On the scienti c attributes of leaders, we have studied whether those with natural science
or medical backgrounds locked down more quickly following the outbreak of COVID. We
also tested whether gender and populism played a role. Our study included all United
Nations member countries with identi able leaders in January 2020 and coded whether
they were led by a man or a woman. We identi ed ‘populists’ based on the list by Kyle and
Meyer (2020). In addition, using the International Standard Classi cation of Education
developed by the United Nations Educational, Scienti c and Cultural Organization (1997),
we collected detailed education data for 185 leaders.
Of the 169 leaders of countries for which we have COVID-19 response data, 13 had a
natural science or medical education, 13 were women, and 17 were populists. Figure 1
shows the six most popular areas of study of leaders, to which we have added the less
popular life and physical sciences. Only 15 leaders (8% of the total) listed in Table 1 qualify
as ‘scientists’ for the purpose of our analysis. These leaders are connected with a range of
pandemic responses. Apart from Angela Merkel, the only other leader who studied a natural
science and completed a doctorate in chemistry is President John Magufuli of Tanzania,
who denied the existence of COVID – and later died, o cially of “heart complications” and
amid rumours he had caught the virus. Among medical doctors, the Irish Taoiseach Leo
Varadkar was praised for his hands-on involvement in the early stages of the pandemic,
while the Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow declared his country free of
COVID and recommended liquorice as a cure.
Figure 1: Selected detailed  elds in leader university degrees
Source: Wehner and Hallerberg (2021).
Our key outcome of interest is the speed of lockdown, which had direct consequences for
subsequent mortality rates. By one estimate, the UK government could have saved 20,000
lives by locking down just one week earlier. Our  rst measure of lockdown is the number of
days from the start of 2020 to the initial nationwide stay-at-home recommendation or order,
according to the Oxford COVID Government Response Tracker dataset. Our second
measure of lockdown is based on the broader Oxford stringency index, which also captures
other containment and closure policies, such as school closures, restrictions on internal
movement or international travel controls. While an examination of the number of days
since 1 January 2020 is a rather blunt measure, alternatives such as the date of lockdown
after the  rst case within a country’s borders, or after a given threshold of cases or deaths,
would rely heavily on (honest) reporting and international comparability.
Figure 2 reports Kaplan-Meier survivor functions that relate leader traits to the probability of
a nationwide stay-at-home measure during the 2020 calendar year. It mattered little
whether countries were led by a scientist, a woman or a populist. Even when other variables
are factored in, including GDP per capita, pandemic preparedness, level of democracy or
whether any COVID deaths had been reported, we  nd no systematic support for the
hypotheses that either scientists, women or non-populists were any quicker in locking
down. 
One possible explanation for these negative results is that our data is too inexact, or too
plagued with measurement errors. Yet the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker
is widely used, and our paper reports statistically meaningful and plausible relationships
with some control variables.
Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier survivor functions for nationwide stay at home measure
Source: Wehner and Hallerberg (2021).
A second explanation would be that we are dealing with observational data that might be
riddled with endogeneity problems. Countries differ in ways that may be correlated with the
traits of their leaders and their policy responses, giving rise to omitted variable bias. Yet our
 ndings are consistent even in a regression framework with controls, which provides some
reassurance. Moreover, some features of our dataset rule out other potential sources of
bias. As the leaders themselves were appointed prior to the pandemic, reciprocal causation
is not a concern. And we counter sample selection bias by achieving 90% coverage of the
eligible population (169 out of 188 UN members with identi able leaders).
A third explanation would be that the lockdown date is a very incomplete measure of what
governments did to  ght the pandemic. The Oxford COVID-19 Government Response
Tracker includes other elements of the response, such as contact tracing and tests. Yet we
looked at their broader stringency index and also found null results.
Rather, we think our results are a cautionary tale about generalisations about how certain
leadership traits translated into different policy responses during the pandemic. A non-
populist female politician with a doctorate in a natural science may have initiated an early
lockdown, as was the case in Germany. But there does not appear to be a systematic
relationship between these traits and the date of lockdown.
Table 1: Leaders with a degree including a natural science or medicine (‘scientists’)
Leader Country Subjects studied
Hubert Minnis Bahamas Biology, medicine
Lotay Tshering Bhutan Medicine, management
Leader Country Subjects studied
Angela Merkel Germany Physics, chemistry
Keith Mitchell Grenada* Chemistry, mathematics, statistics
Alejandro Giammattei Guatemala Medicine
Leo Varadkar Ireland Medicine
Mahathir Mohamad Malaysia Medicine
Saadeddine Othmani Morocco Islamic law and theology, psychiatry, medicine
Kim Jong-un North Korea* Physics, military
James Marape Papua New Guinea Environmental science, business
Bashar al-Assad Syria Medicine
John Magufuli Tanzania Education, mathematics, chemistry
Keith Rowley Trinidad & Tobago Geography
Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow Turkmenistan Medicine
Tabaré Vázquez Uruguay Medicine
Source: Wehner and Hallerberg (2021). Note: * no COVID response available
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